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Abstract—Strong authentication in an interconnected wireless
environment continues to be an important, but sometimes elusive
goal. Research in physical-layer authentication using channel
features holds promise as a technique to improve network
security for a variety of devices. We propose the use of machine
learning and measured multiple-input multiple-output commu-
nications channel information to make a decision on whether
or not to authenticate a particular device. Our approach uses
received channel state information to train a neural network in
an adversarial setting. These characteristics are then used to
maintain authentication in subsequent communication sessions.
This work analyzes the use of information from the wireless
environment for the purpose of authentication and demonstrates
the employment of a generative adversarial neural network
trained with received channel data to authenticate a transmitting
device without prior knowledge of receiver noise.
Index Terms—Physical-layer security, authentication, MIMO,
CSI, machine learning, generative adversarial network
I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of integrity, confidentiality, and availability
is a challenge in wireless networks. Unlike networks with
wired point-to-point connections, the broadcast nature of the
wireless domain grants bona fide users and malicious actors
the same access to the communication channel. As the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project and 5th generation mobile
networks bring the promise of very high data rate mobile com-
munications, they must also be secure. Without appropriate
security, there will be intrusions and attacks, countering the
networks’ benefits.
The literature proposes two broad categories to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate devices at the physical-layer. The
first relies on unique imperfections of the transmitter hardware
that manifest as radio frequency (RF) fingerprints or signatures
[1]–[3]. The second method leverages the stochastic nature
of the wireless channel to take advantage of multi-path fading
environments. The temporally and spatially-unique impulse or
frequency response can be used to identify the transmitter [4]–
[6].
Our proposed method is based on research using the second
category. The effects of the multipath channel can be described
in the channel state information (CSI) matrix. The focus
of this paper is on the static case, and using a technique as
described by [7] can be adopted to account for scenarios where
motion is expected to change the CSI.
In this paper we use a generative adversarial network (GAN)
to determine if a transmitter should be authenticated or denied
access.
The contributions of this paper are:
• We introduce analysis and simulation illustrating how the
received CSI matrix elements and measurement error can
be used for physical-layer authentication.
• There are two novel contributions in this work:
(1) In Section III, a hypothesis test for physical-layer
authentication using all elements in a CSI matrix and the
respective receiver measurement error on those elements.
(2) In Section V, the use of a GAN model to
accurately use MIMO CSI as a basis of authentication
at the physical-layer.
• Distinguishing from previous research, our proposal dis-
cards the generative model at the conclusion of training
and retains the discriminative model. The fully-trained
discriminative model, having learned from a genera-
tive model that creates indistinguishably realistic CSI
samples, is particularly suited to make authentication
decisions.
This paper discusses previous work in physical-layer au-
thentication using machine learning in Section II. Section
III provides the concept for authentication using CSI and
introduces a method to accomplish this. Next we present the
system model for the GAN in Section IV. The development
of the GAN and simulation results is shown in Section V.
Finally, we summarize our observations and discuss future
work in Section VI. With respect to notation, unless otherwise
addressed, vectors are indicated with bold lower-case letters,
and matrices are bold upper-case letters.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The nature of the wireless medium affects the transmitted
signal as it propagates to the receiver. The narrowband model
of the wireless channel is given by
y = Hx + n (1)
where y is the received signal, x is the transmitted signal,
H is the time-varying CSI or channel response, and n is the
noise vector. H is an N ×M matrix of circularly symmet-
ric complex-valued Gaussian random variables representing
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multiple channel conditions such as multi-path fading and
the use of multiple antennas [8]. The number of transmitter
antennas is M and the number of receiver antennas is N .
There are several examples in the literature where authors
mapped collected CSI to the a priori known position of
legitimate transmitters, trained machine learning systems to
recognize those signatures, then accurately determined the
position of the transmitter [9]–[11]. Taking this a step further,
much research has been conducted with machine learning and
location information to make an authentication decision based
on CSI [12]–[15].
In 2014, Goodfellow et al. [16] proposed the novel concept
of a GAN. Composed of two artificial neural network models
called the discriminator and the generator, the GAN framework
trains these models as they compete against each other in
an adversarial competition. While GANs have successfully
contributed to many areas that rely on image processing such
as single image super-resolution [17], medical radiology [18],
facial recognition [19], etc., there have been breakthroughs by
applying GANs to investigations in the RF field as well.
O’Shea et al. [20] used a GAN to determine the opti-
mal modulation scheme in a given channel, showing how
GANs can allow for adaptation to the RF environment. In
an adversarial situation such as jamming and spoofing, Roy
[21] proposed the use of GANs for building a robust system
that can determine legitimate transmitters from illegitimate
ones based on the imbalance of in-phase and quadrature
components of a symbol constellation. The amplitude-feature
deep convolutional GAN was used by Li et al. [22] to reduce
the effort and increase the accuracy in creating a MIMO CSI-
based fingerprint database for a Wi-Fi localization system. By
combining samples created from collected CSI and samples
created with generated CSI data, the error distance was re-
duced compared to only using processed collected CSI data.
The results improved the accuracy of locating the position of
transmitters in an indoor, classroom setting.
III. AUTHENTICATION WITH CSI
A receiver continues to authenticate a transmitter if the
received CSI varies less than a threshold applied to the
received CSI from previous transmissions. During initial
authentication, by such means as cryptography or RF finger-
printing, the receiver makes CSI measurements of the channel
and stores that information for future authentication.
During channel measurement, the receiver imparts noise to
the received signal, resulting in variation to the measured CSI
elements. This error, , is modeled as an additive complex
zero-mean Gaussian process, CN (0,Σ), where the covari-
ance of the sample mean is Σ = Σ/s for s samples during
the measurement. Therefore, the kth CSI measured by the
receiver, Hˆk, is given as
Hˆk = H + k k = 1, 2, . . . , s (2)
where H is the true CSI from (1) and k is a complex N ×M
matrix with independent identically distributed elements.
A threshold is then applied to each CSI element, hn,m,
where the transmitter is authenticated if the distance from
every received element, hˆn,m,k from Hˆk for k > s, to the
estimated element, hn,m from H, is less than or equal to a
threshold, zn,m, based on the average eigenvalue, λave, from
the covariance matrix Σn,m . To simplify the notation, we will
consider zn,m the same value z for all n and m terms, however
in practice, z could vary among CSI elements. The numbered
sequential transmission count is represented by k. Following
the hypothesis testing in [23], we have the null hypothesis,H0,
to authenticate, and the alternative hypothesis, H1, to deny
authentication
H0 :(Re(hˆn,m,k)− Re(hn,m))2
+ (Im(hˆn,m,k)− Im(hn,m))2 ≤ z2 ∀n,m
H1 :(Re(hˆn,m,k)− Re(hn,m))2
+ (Im(hˆn,m,k)− Im(hn,m))2 > z2 ∃n,m
(3)
where Re(·) and Im(·) return the real and imaginary parts
of the CSI matrix elements, respectively and z, is a tunable
parameter that can be adjusted to suit the requirements of the
system. To minimize false positives, z can be set to a relatively
small value such as λ
1
2
ave, and to minimize false negatives, z
can be expanded to a greater value, such as 6λ
1
2
ave. In order to
successfully authenticate, all elements in H and z must jointly
achieve theH0 result. We can determine the probability of one
transmitter being accidentally authenticated as another based
on the error tolerance for the first transmitter, z. Let an,m be
the real part and bn,m be the imaginary part of the complex
value for the true CSI element, hn,m = an,m + jbn,m. Both
an,m and bn,m are independent Gaussian random variables
with variance σ2/2. To this variable, we add the result of the
receiver noise, . The real and imaginary parts of n,m are
zero-mean independent Gaussian distributed random variables
each with sample mean covariance Σn,m .
For a transmitter to be authenticated, H0 must be satisfied
for every CSI element, hn,m. Given hn,m = an,m + jbn,m,
we can determine the probability that another transmitter will
be authenticated. Let z = 5λ
1
2
ave where λave is the average
eigenvalue from the receiver noise covariance matrix, Σn,m
and u and v be the respective real and imaginary parts of
the CSI from another transmitter. The probability of u + jv
resulting in H0 for hn,m is
P ([u+ jv] ∈ Dn,m) =
∫∫
Dn,m
exp
(
−u2+v2σ2
)
2pi
√|Σu,v| du dv
where,
Dn,m = {(u, v) | (u− an,m)2 + (v − bn,m)2 ≤ z2}
µu,v =
(
0
0
)
, Σu,v =
(
σ2/2 0
0 σ2/2
)
(4)
With independent u and v, (4) can be evaluated
using P (X ∩ Y ) = P (Y |X) · P (X), where P (X)
is the probability that an,m − z ≤ u ≤ an,m + z,
and P (Y |X) is the probability that
bn,m 9
√
z2 9 (u 9 an,m)2 ≤ v ≤ bn,m +
√
z2 9 (u 9 an,m)2.
Therefore,
P ([u+ jv] ∈ Dn,m) = (Q(A)−Q(B)) · (Q(C)−Q(D))
where,
A =
an,m − z
σ
B =
an,m + z
σ
C =
bn,m −
√
z2 − (u− an,m)2
σ
D =
bn,m +
√
z2 − (u− an,m)2
σ
and the Q(·) function is
Q(x) =
∫ +∞
x
1√
2pi
exp
(
− t
2
2
)
dt
(5)
The transmitter must satisfy H0 for every CSI element. The
probability for authentication in a MIMO channel with M
transmit antennas and N receive antennas is then
M∏
m=1
N∏
n=1
P ([un,m + jvn,m] ∈ Dn,m)
Dn,m = {(un,m, vn,m) | (un,m − an,m)2
+ (vn,m − bn,m)2 ≤ z2}
(6)
Simulating (5) and (6) with an,m, bn,m, u, and v all distributed
as N (0, 0.5), Fig. 1 illustrates how unlikely an accidental
authentication will be as the antenna elements of the receiver
and transmitter are increased and the threshold is reduced.
To implement this authentication scheme and determine
which hypothesis hˆn,m,k satisfies, we require advance knowl-
edge of the noise power our receiver imparts to H to determine
z and that may change over time and be different among de-
vices. Instead, we will allow a neural network to implicitly de-
termine the threshold and perform the authentication decision.
We created a GAN that is trained on authentic samples from
Fig. 1: Probability of authentication for various MIMO con-
figurations and thresholds
Fig. 2: Training a generative adversarial network
a dataset and samples produced by a generative model. The
discriminative model then learned the characteristics of hn,m
and Σn,m . Following training, two testing datasets validated
the performance of the discriminative model to accurately
distinguish H between trusted and untrusted transmitters.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a wireless MIMO communications channel
with trusted users and untrusted users, some of the latter
group who are malicious adversaries. The adversaries have
resources available to change their antenna characteristics,
transmitter RF path timing, output power, and/or present
reflectors between themselves and the receiver. Thus, they
are able to change their CSI as measured by the receiver. To
defeat this scenario, the discriminative model at the receiver
is adversarially trained by a generative model that creates
authentic looking CSI samples.
During training, the discriminative model, D, receives au-
thentic samples from the training data or fake samples gener-
ated by the generative model, G. The generative model creates
fake samples based on a function from random variable input,
z , and the parameters in G. The discriminative model then
assigns a probability from zero to one based on whether
the sample is fake (0.0) or authentic (1.0). Fig. 2 shows a
functional depiction of a GAN in training, where J (D) and
J (G) are the loss functions for the discriminative model and
the generative model, respectively.
The adversarial competition in the GAN is a minimax game
where the discriminative model attempts to correctly label
training samples from a distribution produced by CSI matrix
elements, pdata(hn,m), and fake training samples created by
the generator. The discriminative model is trained to maximize
the probability of assigning the correct label, while the gener-
ative model is trained to minimize the same probability.
V. SIMULATION
The GAN processed a single subcarrier in a MIMO 4× 4
configuration. Therefore, the discriminative model has 16
complex inputs and 1 real output, while the generative model
has 1 real input and 16 complex outputs. The inputs for the
discriminative model and the outputs for the generative model
represent the complex elements in the CSI matrix. A dataset
of 3,000 authentic training samples were created, where each
sample is a 4× 4 complex matrix.
TABLE I: GAN architecture
Discriminator:
Layer output size activation
Input 1: x ∼ pdata(x1,1) 2
Input 2: x ∼ pdata(x1,2) 2
...
...
Input 16: x ∼ pdata(x4,4) 2
Concatenated 32
Fully connected 64 LeakyReLU (alpha = 0.3)
Dropout = 0.2
Fully connected 32 LeakyReLU (alpha = 0.3)
Dropout = 0.2
Output 1 Sigmoid
Generator:
Layer output size activation
Input: z ∼ pz(z) 5
Fully connected 16 LeakyReLU (alpha = 0.3)
Fully connected 32 LeakyReLU (alpha = 0.3)
Fully connected 64 tanh
Output 1 2 linear
Output 2 2 linear
...
...
...
Output 16 2 linear
A. GAN development
The GAN is implemented using the Python programming
language, Keras [24] front-end, and Tensorflow [25] back-
end. Additionally, Numpy, Pandas, and Matplotlib Python
libraries were used. The overall GAN design is summarized
in Table I, with a total of 9,057 parameters. The file size of
the discriminator network was 98.8 KB.
B. Datasets
The training dataset consists of 3,000 samples. Each sample
is created by adding measurement error in the form of AWGN
to a single CSI matrix composed of 16 circularly symmetric
Gaussian complex values with zero mean, and unit variance,
CN (0, 1). The GAN was trained using mini-batches of 64.
Two testing datasets were created, each consisting of 1,500
samples. The first testing dataset replicated the accidental
authentication case. There are two transmitters, one of which
should be authenticated. For the transmitter that should be
authenticated, the same random number generator seed from
the training dataset was used and a single CSI matrix was
created, while another CSI matrix for the other transmitter
was generated using a different seed. To both of these, the
same AWGN distribution was added to simulate CSI mea-
surement error, resulting in 250 legitimate samples, and 1,250
illegitimate samples. The second testing dataset emulated five
nefarious users attempting to authenticate by matching the
CSI matrix of a single legitimate transmitter. If by some
unlikely method, an adversary were able to know the channel
characteristics between two legitimately authenticated trans-
mitters, the adversary may also have the resources necessary to
spoof their transmitted CSI to appear as another transmitter’s
received CSI. As before, an AWGN distribution was added to
simulate CSI measurement error, resulting in 250 legitimate
samples. To complete this dataset, five different offsets were
added to the CSI measurement error real and imaginary
components from the legitimate transmitter, resulting in five
subsets of 250 samples each.
C. Results
The performance of the discriminative model indicates the
viability of using a GAN for physical-layer authentication
using CSI. The results for the five nefarious user testing
dataset is shown using the confusion matrix in Fig. 3a. The
same test dataset used on the discriminator was applied to the
hypothesis test in (3) where the test was 100% accurate when
z ranged from 5λ
1
2
ave to 9λ
1
2
ave as shown in Fig. 3b. When z
was less than 5λ
1
2
ave, legitimate samples were misidentified,
and when z was greater than 9λ
1
2
ave, illegitimate samples were
then misidentified. The advantage to using the GAN is that
z doesn’t need to be determined in advance. To obtain 100%
accuracy with the accidental authentication testing dataset, the
discriminator needed to be trained at least 19 epochs, and using
the hypothesis test, z ranged from 5λ
1
2
ave to 20λ
1
2
ave.
(a) GAN confusion matrix (b) Hyptothesis test confusion matrix
Fig. 3: Confusion matrices for five adversaries and one legitimate transmitter test dataset for (a) GAN and (b) hypothesis test
To compare the relative performance of the GAN-trained
discriminator and the hypothesis test in (3) for noisy receivers,
AWGN was increased by an order of magnitude to the re-
ceived samples in the training and nefarious adversaries testing
datasets. The hypothesis test resulted in 97.4% accuracy with
z = 3λ
1
2
ave, while the discriminator was 99.07% accurate
after 28 training epochs. The hypothesis test authenticated
212 out of 250 legitimate samples, and denied authentication
to 1250 illegitimate samples. The discriminator authenticated
236 legitimate samples, and like the hypothesis test, it denied
authentication to 1250 samples. Further increasing the re-
ceiver noise diminished the performance of both authentication
methods using the original testing datasets.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We showed how CSI could be used as a method to provide
physical-layer authentication. Our analysis illustrated that the
probability of accidentally authenticating other transmitters
decreases as receive and transmit antennas are increased and
a threshold value is judiciously applied. We then developed
a GAN trained on a dataset of CSI matrices to perform
physical-layer authentication in an adversarial environment.
After training less than 30 epochs, the discriminator was 100%
accurate, implicitly determining appropriate thresholds for
received CSI matrix elements without information regarding
receiver noise. The discriminator performance was superior to
the hypothesis method when receiver noise was increased by
an order of magnitude.
This paper demonstrated how physical-layer authentication
can be accomplished in a flat fading single subchannel envi-
ronment. By applying this concept to multiple subchannels,
there is an opportunity for obtaining robust multi-channel
characteristics that can be used to identify a transmitter for
authentication. Furthermore, the GAN should be evaluated on
additional training and test datasets to demonstrate effective-
ness in a variety of wireless environments.
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